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Abstract 
 
This paper focuses on the approaches of international criminal judges to using external 
precedent, distinguishing between the appraisal-based and flexible approaches. On the one 
hand, the appraisal-based approach refers to uses of external judicial decisions which are 
preceded by an express legal appraisal. On the other hand, the flexible approach denotes a 
less stringent use of such decisions. It finds that, in a number of cases, international criminal 
judges have adopted a flexible approach to such decisions and have assimilated them within 
the legal framework of the referring court or tribunal without the necessary adjustment. This 
may have profound implications for the principle of legality and the fairness of the 
proceedings. The paper indicates that the adoption of either the appraisal-based or flexible 
approaches to external judicial decisions is not necessarily linked to the specific legal 
backgrounds of the judges involved, and different judges hailing from varying legal 
backgrounds have shifted between these approaches in different cases. This suggests that 
there is need for greater rigour in the judicial methodology for using external judicial 
decisions and, in particular, the importance of the appraisal-based approach to using such 
decisions, to ensure their the congruence with the legal framework of the referring court or 
tribunal. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper examines the approaches of judges at five international and internationalized 
criminal courts and tribunals to using judicial decisions from other courts and tribunals
1
 in the 
context of substantive law. The starting point for this discussion is that, generally, 
international judges are ‘aware of the limits of reliance on the case law of...all national and 
international courts...They understand perfectly the need to take the specificity of 
international criminal justice into consideration.’
2
 However, in some cases, judges have not 
appraised external judicial decisions appropriately to take account of the specificity of 
international criminal law (‘ICL’) and have adopted a flexible approach towards such case 
law. Using the notion of appraisal as a criterion, this paper distinguishes between the 
appraisal-based and flexible approaches. On the one hand, the appraisal-based approach 
refers to instance of use of external judicial decisions which are preceded by an express legal 
appraisal.
3
 On the other hand, the flexible approach denotes a less stringent use of such 
decisions and refers to cases where they are used without express appraisal in the judgment. 
 
                                                            
1 Referred to as ‘external judicial decisions’ or ‘external precedent.’ 
2
 A. Cassese, ‘The Influence of the European Court of Human Rights on International Criminal Tribunals - 
Some Methodological Remarks’, in M. Bergsmo (ed.) Human Rights and Criminal Justice For the 
Downtrodden: Essays in Honour of Asbjorn Eide (2003), 26. 
3 The elements of this appraisal are discussed below. 
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The findings of this paper are based on an analysis of the judgments, both trial and appeal, 
delivered by the (1) the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’); 
(2) the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (‘ICTR’); (3) the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone (‘SCSL’); (4) the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (‘ECCC’), and 
(5) the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’).
4
 Only express instances of use of external 
judicial decisions relating to substantive law were included in the analysis, and any uses 
relating mainly to procedural rules or sentencing were not covered.
5
 In total, the analysis 
included (counting both trial and appeal): 74 judgments of the ICTY; 73 of the ICTR; 7 of the 
SCSL; 2 of the ECCC; and 1 of the ICC. 
 
Part two of this paper outlines the elements of the appraisal-based approach and specifies the 
steps involved in the legal appraisal. Part three proceeds to discuss the legal basis for using 
external precedent by the various courts and tribunals. Part four then considers some 
instances in which international judges adopted an appraisal-based approach to external 
judicial decisions, focusing on instances where such decisions required adjustment. 
Subsequently, the limits of such adjustment are considered in relation to the subject of crimes 
against humanity under the Rome Statute of the ICC. Part five examines specific cases in 
which international judges adopted a more or less flexible approach to such decisions, 
focusing on: (1) national judicial decisions; (2) judicial decisions from international courts 
operating in other branches of law; and (3) judicial decisions from sister international 
criminal courts and tribunals. Part six provides a brief overview of instances where the 
approach of the same individual judge was not consistent in different cases. The paper finds 
that, in a number of cases, international criminal judges have adopted a flexible approach to 
external judicial decisions which may have profound implications for the law applied by the 
referring court or tribunal and may, ultimately, impact on the principle of legality and the 
fairness of the proceedings. It suggests that there is need for greater rigour in the judicial 
methodology for using external judicial decisions and, in particular, the importance of the 
appraisal-based approach to ensure the congruence of such decisions with the legal 
framework of the referring court or tribunal. 
 
2. An outline of the appraisal-based and flexible approaches 
 
There are a number of possible lenses through which one could analyse the use of external 
precedent in international adjudication. In the literature on interjudicial dialogue, for instance, 
the focus is on external judicial decisions as instances of an ‘ongoing jurisprudential dialogue 
between international courts.’
6
 Alternatively, one could assess the impact of decisions of 
                                                            
4
 Only judgments delivered by 18 May 2012 have been included (this date was chosen to be inclusive of the 
SCSL’s Taylor Trial Judgment). The paper provides only a limited number of representative examples from this 
analysis. A full list of judgments is available on record with the author. 
5
 The paper does not cover external judicial decisions used in relation to rules of procedure and evidence and 
sentencing because of the tribunal-specific and sui generis nature of these rules. See C. Stahn and L. van den 
Herik, ‘“Fragmentation”, Diversification and “3D” Legal Pluralism: International Criminal Law as the Jack-in-
the-Box’, in L. van den Herik and C. Stahn (eds.), The Diversification and Fragmentation of International 
Criminal Law (2012), 78-79. It is acknowledged, however, that in some cases the line between substance and 
procedure may be difficult to draw and ‘[w]hile textbooks commonly contain separate sections dealing with 
substantive and procedural law, respectively, the question of where the dividing line lies, and how they are 
connected, is usually neglected’: see A. Nollkaemper, ‘International Adjudication of Global Public Goods: The 
Intersection of Substance and Procedure’, (2012) 23 EJIL 769, at 771. 
6
 C.  P.  R. Romano, ‘Deciphering the Grammar of the International Jurisprudential Dialogue’, (2009) 41 J Int'L 
L & Pol 755, at 758. See also A. M. Slaughter, ‘A Global Community of Courts’, (2003) 44 Harv Int'l L J 191, 
at 194. 
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various international courts on the coherence of international law as a system.
7
 On occasion, 
competing decisions of international courts have been characterised as instances of 
fragmentation in the system.
8
 Moreover, from the perspective of the doctrine of sources of 
international law, one could assess whether judges approach external judicial decisions as 
subsidiary means or as sources of law,
9
 or even as ‘apparent quasi-independent authority that 
cannot be reduced to a constituent element of either customary international law or a general 
principle of (international) law.’
10
 
 
This paper adopts an appraisal-based framework for examining the approaches of 
international judges to external precedent. For an instance of use of an external judicial 
decision to be characterised as ‘appraisal-based,’ from a reading of the judgment, it has to be 
possible to identify an express legal appraisal of that decision. This criterion reflects the 
holding of the ICTY Trial Chamber in Kupreškić et al.: 
 
international criminal courts...must always carefully appraise decisions of other courts 
before relying on their persuasive authority as to existing law. Moreover, they should 
apply a stricter level of scrutiny to national decisions than to international judgments, as 
the latter are at least based on the same corpus of law as that applied by international 
courts, whereas the former tend to apply national law, or primarily that law, or else 
interpret international rules through the prism of national legislation.
11
 
 
In the above, although the need for a careful appraisal of external judicial decisions was 
underscored, the Chamber did not articulate the precise content of this appraisal. In view of 
the centrality of this notion here, it is firstly useful to provide a definition. To ‘appraise’ 
ordinarily means ‘[t]o assess the value or worth of, to evaluate’ or ‘[t]o estimate or assess the 
quality, worth, etc., of; to scrutinize critically’.
12
 The particular legal framework of the 
referring court or tribunal (including its aims and objectives, the substantive law, and any 
                                                            
7 For instance, Anderson maintains that ‘[j]udges have a duty to administer justice in the particular case, while 
keeping in mind the coherence of the legal system as a whole’: see D. Anderson, ‘The “Disordered Medley” of 
International Tribunals And the Coherence of International Law’, in K. H. Kaikobad and M. Bohlander (eds.), 
International Law and Power: Perspectives on Legal Order and Justice: Essays in Honour of Colin Warbrick 
(2009), 397. 
8
 The Report by the International Law Commission (‘ILC’) on the Fragmentation of International Law examines 
the conflict between the Nicaragua and Tadić decisions under the heading ‘Fragmentation through conflicting 
interpretations of general law’ and states, inter alia, ‘[t]he contrast between Nicaragua and Tadic is an example 
of a normative conflict between an earlier and a later interpretation of a rule of general international law’: see 
Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law (finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi), UNGA 58th session, Doc. No. A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006), at paras. 49-50. See also G. 
Acquaviva, ‘Aiding and abetting international crimes and the value  of judicial consistency: reflections 
prompted by the Perisic, Taylor and Sainovic verdicts’, (2014) 3 Questions of International Law 3, at 4. 
9
 See G. G. Fitzmaurice, ‘Some Problems Regarding the Formal Sources of International Law’, in M. 
Koskenniemi, Sources of International Law (2000), 153 at 171. 
10 See A. Nollkaemper, ‘Decisions of National Courts as Sources of International Law: An Analysis of the 
Practice of the ICTY’, in G. Boas and W. Schabas (eds.), International Criminal Law Developments in the Case 
Law of the ICTY (2003), 277. 
11
 Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreškić, Mirjan Kupreškić, Vlatko Kupreškić, Drago Josipović, Dragan Papić, 
Vladimir Šantić, also known as ‘Vlado’, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-16-T, 14 January 2000, at para. 542. 
Emphasis added. Significantly, however, this paper diverges from the Kupreškić et al. holding in that it requires 
such appraisals to be made express in the judgment.  
12
 Oxford English Dictionary Online, ‘Definition of appraise’, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/9774?redirectedFrom=appraise#eid [last accessed 5 January 2015]. 
Page 3 of 20
Cambridge University Press
Leiden Journal of International Law
For Review Only
4 
 
interpretive instruments such as elements of crime) furnishes the yardstick for this 
assessment. Against this yardstick, all external judicial decisions have to be evaluated.  
 
Conceptually, at least, the legal appraisal should follow a determination of relevance, i.e. the 
appraisal of external judicial decisions should occur after those decisions would have been 
selected as relevant to the case at hand. It should, however, precede a determination of their 
persuasive value. The legal appraisal of external judicial decisions, firstly, entails an 
assessment of the law being interpreted and applied by those decisions and, secondly, an 
evaluation of the congruence of that law with the legal framework of the referring court or 
tribunal at the relevant time. As discussed below in relation to the Barbie case, the appraisal 
of the law being applied by those decisions should also take into account broader, contextual 
considerations which may interfere with the law being applied – such as the potential 
influence of local idiosyncrasies.
13
 
 
While the need for this legal appraisal may appear evident in the case of national judicial 
decisions, as they belong to a different corpus of law, it is also important with respect to 
decisions from other areas of international law because of the specificities of ICL. These 
specificities include the fact that, although it is a branch of international law, ICL is ‘an 
essentially hybrid branch of law: it is public international law impregnated with notions, 
principles, and legal constructs derived from national criminal law, [international 
humanitarian law (‘IHL’)] as well as human rights law.’
14
 What this means, in effect, is that 
the requirements that the legal prohibitions be as clear, detailed, and specific as possible, and 
that there be no punishment for conduct that was not considered as criminal at the time when 
it was taken, flowing from the principles of legality and nullum crimen sine lege, are far more 
pronounced in ICL than they are in general international law.
15
 ICL ‘simultaneously derives 
its origins from, and continuously draws upon, international humanitarian law, human rights 
law and national criminal law.’
16
 With respect to IHL, the Trial Chamber in Krnojelac 
emphasised the structural differences between this and other branches of international law: 
 
the Trial Chamber is mindful of the specificity of international humanitarian law. Care 
must be taken to ensure that this specificity is not lost by broadening each of the crimes 
over which the Tribunal has jurisdiction to the extent that the same facts come to 
constitute all or most of those crimes. In particular, when relying upon human rights 
law relating to torture, the Trial Chamber must take into account the structural 
differences which exist between that body of law and international humanitarian law, in 
                                                            
13 Another example of such a local idiosyncrasy, taken from a different branch of international law, relates to the 
ICJ’s Nicaragua case and the Connelly reservation to the jurisdiction of the Court. As Bianchi observes, ‘[t]he 
Connelly reservation, attached by the US to the unilateral declaration of acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction, 
prevented the Court from applying the [UN] Charter to the case at hand. Therefore, in order to decide the case 
on the merit, the Court was compelled to find rules of customary international law applicable to the conduct of 
the United States, regardless of the UN Charter provisions’: see A. Bianchi, ‘The International Regulation of the 
Use of Force: The Politics of the Interpretive Method’ in L. van den Herik and N. Schrijver (eds.), Counter-
Terrorism Strategies In a Fragmented International Legal Order: Meeting the Challenges (2013), 296. In this 
case, therefore, the Connelly reservation may be characterised as a local idiosyncrasy which influenced the law 
being applied in Nicaragua and, in particular, its identification of rules of customary international law 
applicable to the use of force separate from the UN Charter provisions. Indeed, Bianchi postulates that ‘the ICJ’s 
findings might have been prompted by the need to circumvent the difficulty posed by the Connelly reservation 
to the jurisdiction of the Court’: see ibid. 
14
 A. Cassese et al., International Criminal Law: Cases & Commentary (2011), 13. 
15
 A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (2008), 8. See also C. J. M. Safferling and L. Büngener, International 
Criminal Procedure (2012), 25. 
16 See Cassese et al. supra note 14, at 1. 
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particular the distinct role and function attributed to states and individuals in each 
regime. However, this does not preclude recourse to human rights law in respect of 
those aspects which are common to both regimes.
17
 
 
Although decisions from sister international criminal courts and tribunals would already 
follow the logic of ICL, a legal appraisal of these decisions would nevertheless be necessary 
in order to assess their congruence with the specific legal framework of the referring court or 
tribunal at the relevant time and for any necessary adjustment to be undertaken.  
 
Following this appraisal, the international judge would determine whether the external 
judicial decisions may (or may not) be assimilated within the legal framework of the referring 
court or tribunal and whether they would require adjustment. Admittedly, it is not possible to 
stipulate a priori the level of detail for this appraisal because this would depend on the 
particular circumstances of each case. As noted in Kupreškić et al., the appropriate level of 
appraisal would depend on whether the decisions are national or international. It may also 
depend on other factors, such as the state of development of the referring court or tribunal’s 
own jurisprudence.
18
 This paper, therefore, does not seek to set down the appropriate level of 
detail of the appraisal in each case. It rather focuses on examining whether it is possible to 
identify an express legal appraisal preceding the use of external judicial decisions in the 
judgment. Thus, where an express appraisal is provided, the instance of use is characterised 
as ‘appraisal-based’. Conversely, where a decision is used without express appraisal, the 
instance is characterised as ‘flexible.’
19
 This framework has the advantage of focusing 
attention on the appraisal (or lack thereof) accorded to external judicial decisions – a subject 
which has not received much attention in the literature.
20
 The importance of this focus is not 
only limited to reasons of legal rigour, but is also necessary: 
 
to satisfy the fundamental requirements of the principle of fair trial, especially the 
obligation, derived from this principle, to respect the rights of the accused. Indeed, the 
adoption of a legally rigorous approach reduces the margin for arbitrary decisions by 
the international judge.
21
 
 
The paper provides a basis for further research in this area. However, some limitations with 
respect to the scope of the analysis should be highlighted. In particular, the paper focuses 
solely on express appraisals of external judicial decisions as they may be identified from a 
reading of the judgment. Any appraisals which may have occurred ‘behind the scenes’, for 
instance, during judicial deliberations, but which would not have been expressly recorded in 
the judgment have not been taken into account. This is an important limitation because the 
                                                            
17
 Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac, Judgment, Case No. IT-97-25-T, 15 March 2002, at para. 181. 
18
 Cassese notes that when the ad hoc Tribunals had reached a stage when a copious case law had been 
developed, in some cases, it no longer remained necessary for the Tribunals to discuss the applicable law at 
great length and they confined themselves to citing previous case law without necessarily undertaking a detailed 
analysis. See A. Cassese, ‘Black Letter Lawyering v. Constructive Interpretation: The Vasiljević Case’, (2004) 2 
JICJ 265, at 265. 
19 Elsewhere, this author has examined the approaches of judges to external precedent through the direct and 
indirect lenses. That analysis focused on whether judges relied on the legal findings or conclusions of particular 
external judicial decisions directly (the direct approach) or whether they borrowed from such decisions the 
reviews of state practice and opinio juris in the context of custom or, in the context of general principles, the 
surveys of national jurisdictions (the indirect approach). That analysis thus has a different focus from the present 
enterprise. See A. Zammit Borda, ‘The Direct and Indirect Approaches to Precedent in International Criminal 
Courts and Tribunals’, (2013) 14 MJIL 608-642. 
20
 For a notable exception, see Cassese, supra note 2, at 19. 
21 Ibid., at 21. 
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lack of an express appraisal in the judgment would not necessarily indicate that such an 
appraisal had not taken place, but could simply mean that, for reasons of drafting styles or 
space limitations, it was not expressly included in the judgment. Nevertheless, it is considered 
that, where judges have used external precedents in their judgments without express appraisal 
– sometimes ‘without indicating (or even so much as raising the question of) the value or 
significance of their reference to the case law of other national or international courts’
22
 – it is 
legitimate to characterise their approaches as more or less flexible. 
 
3. The legal basis for using external precedent 
 
Before proceeding to examine the approaches of international judges to external precedent, it 
is necessary to consider the legal basis for using such precedent by the respective courts and 
tribunals.
23
 Naturally, the point of departure has to be their constitutive statutes and legal 
framework. Thus, although the Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals do not contain specific 
provisions on the applicable law, judges at these Tribunals have generally, and with some 
notable exceptions,
24
 followed the doctrine of sources under customary international law, as 
reflected in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’). Within 
this doctrine, external precedents have the value of subsidiary means for the determination of 
rules of international law.
25
 Judges at these courts and tribunals have consistently reiterated 
that such precedents do not have binding force. For instance, in Kupreskic et al., the ICTY 
Trial Chamber held: 
 
[b]eing international in nature and applying international law principaliter, the Tribunal 
cannot but rely upon the well-established sources of international law and, within this 
framework, upon judicial decisions. What value should be given to such decisions? The 
Trial Chamber holds the view that they should only be used as a ‘subsidiary means for 
the determination of rules of law’…Clearly, judicial precedent is not a distinct source 
of law in international criminal adjudication.
26
 
 
In Karemera et al., the ICTR Appeals Chamber held further that ‘[t]here is no doctrine of 
precedence in international law which requires a Trial Chamber to follow practices or 
decisions adopted by another international court.’
27
 The ECCC similarly emphasised that the 
judicial decisions of the ad hoc Tribunals (and presumably other courts and tribunals) ‘are 
                                                            
22
 Ibid., at 21-2. 
23
 See Zammit Borda, supra note 19, at 612. 
24 For instance, in his celebrated dissent in Erdemović, Judge Li appeared to depart from the traditional view of 
judicial decisions as subsidiary means under Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute. He ‘took the position that legal 
norms might be inferred from case law, including national case law, and that the criteria for doing so were 
distinct from the identification of rules of customary law or general principles of law’: see Nollkaemper, supra 
note 10, at 290. See also A. Zammit Borda, ‘The Use of Precedent as Subsidiary Means and Sources of 
International Criminal Law’, (2013) 18 Tilburg Law Review 65, 75. 
25
 For a discussion of judicial decisions under Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute, see A. Zammit Borda, ‘A 
Formal Approach to Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute from the Perspective of the International Criminal Courts 
and Tribunals’, (2013)24 EJIL 649, 649. It is noted that ‘[j]udicial decisions used as evidences of customary 
international law are more intimately connected with the law-creating processes, and their consideration under 
Article 38(1)(d) risks muddying the distinction between law-creating processes and law-determining agencies. 
As such, they are more appropriately considered under Article 38(1)(b), rather than Article 38(1)(d). The same 
reasoning applies to all judicial decisions used as material sources of rules of international law, such as judicial 
decisions used in identifying (or negating) general principles of law’, ibid., at 657.  
26
 Kupreškić et al. Trial Judgment, supra note 11, at para. 540. 
27
 Prosecutor v. Édouard Karemera, Athieu Ngirumpatse, Joseph Nzirorera, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal 
Regarding Witness Proofing, Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR73.8, 11 May 2007, at para. 7. 
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non-binding and are not, in and of themselves, primary sources of international law for the 
ECCC.’
28
 Thus, judges at these courts and tribunals have generally taken the view that 
external precedent has no binding force in the referring court or tribunal, but may have 
persuasive value.
29
 
 
With respect to the SCSL, Article 20(3) of its Statute states that in hearing appeals, ‘[t]he 
judges of the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court shall be guided by the decisions of the 
Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.’ 
Although this Article was drafted in mandatory language (‘shall be guided…’), in practice, it 
has been interpreted permissively, allowing the SCSL judges, where appropriate, to have 
recourse to relevant decisions of the ad hoc Tribunals. Indeed, a SCSL Chamber emphasised 
that Article 20(3) should not be construed to mean that the decisions of the ad hoc Tribunals 
are in any way binding on the SCSL. In the RUF Case, the SCSL Trial Chamber insisted that 
it is ‘not bound by decisions of the ICTY Appeals Chamber’.
30
 Moreover, in Taylor, the 
SCSL Appeals Chamber rejected the specific direction requirement, which had been upheld 
by the ICTY Appeals Chamber, in Perisic, a few months earlier.31 Thus, Article 20(3) of 
SCSL Statute may be seen as a particularization of the general rule regarding the status of 
judicial decisions under Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute. It does not, however, detract from 
that rule, namely, that such external judicial decisions do not have binding force, but may 
have persuasive value. 
 
With respect to the ICC, Article 21 of the Rome Statute makes provision for that Court’s 
applicable law and sub-paragraph (2) thereof states that the ICC ‘may apply principles and 
rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions.’ However, this provision only covers the 
ICC’s own previous decisions and not external precedent. This was confirmed by the ICC 
Trial Chamber, in Lubanga, which held that ‘decisions of other international courts and 
tribunals are not part of the directly applicable law under Article 21 of the [Rome] Statute.’
32
 
This Article does not therefore expressly provide a legal basis for the ICC to use external 
precedent. Thus, given that Article 21 of the Rome Statute does not expressly embrace 
external precedent, the view may be taken that the use of such precedent should be excluded. 
However, it is considered that the better position would be to recall that Article 21(1)(b) 
authorizes the Court to apply ‘the principles and rules of international law’ and that, 
therefore, the Court may use external judicial decisions through this channel, i.e. as 
subsidiary means for the determination of these rules of law.
33
  
 
                                                            
28 Kaing Guek Eav alias ‘Duch’, Appeal Judgment, Case No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/SC, 3 February 2012, at 
para. 97. 
29
 The distinction between binding force and persuasive value of external precedent, particularly when viewed in 
binary terms, has been challenged. Jacob, for instance, makes the point that ‘a crude binary understanding of a 
case’s normativity (‘binding or not’) belies the complexity of the reasoning processes accompanying the 
practical application of precedents’: see M. Jacob, ‘Precedents: Lawmaking Through International 
Adjudication’, (2011) 12 German Law Journal 1005, at 1015-1016.  
30
 Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon, Augustine Gbao, Judgment, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, 2 
March 2009, at para. 295. 
31
 See Acquaviva, supra note 8, at 13. 
32
 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/06, 14 March 2012, at para. 603. 
33 Nerlich considers that the basis for using external precedent when interpreting the Rome Statute and its 
subsidiary instruments may be found ‘in a broader conception of the context in which these instruments have to 
be interpreted, and in the purpose underlying Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention’: see V. Nerlich, ‘The 
Status of ICTY and ICTR Precedent in Proceedings Before the ICC’, in C. Stahn and G. Sluiter, The Emerging 
Practice of the International Criminal Court (2009), 320. 
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The present author is of the view that Article 21 of the Rome Statute does not exclude the use 
of external precedent. In this respect, Acquaviva notes that the ICC ‘heavily relies, in its 
reasoning on both substantive and procedural matters, on the case-law of other international 
criminal courts and tribunals, despite its relatively close[d] system dictated by Article 21 of 
the Rome Statute.’
34
 Similarly, the editors of Archbold observe that: 
 
[i]n determining the scope and application of Article 21 of the Rome Statute, the ICC 
has emphasized the obligation to apply its own regime. However, this does not mean 
that the accumulated jurisprudence emanating from the ICTY/R, SCSL, ECCC and 
STL will be simply jettisoned away. Rather, the jurisprudence from other international 
or internationalized or hybrid courts is not ‘automatically applicable to the ICC without 
detailed analysis.’
35
 
 
While it is, therefore, possible to identify a basis for the use of external precedent even with 
respect to the Rome Statute, different judges and commentators may hold differing views 
with respect to the legitimacy of such use. For instance, with respect to the ICC, Nerlich takes 
the view that ‘the doctrinal foundation for relying on the precedent of the ad hoc tribunals 
when interpreting the [ICC’s] legal texts is admittedly weak.’
36
 A related question concerns 
the methodology for selecting relevant decisions, particularly considering that on a given 
point of law, there may be several international and national decisions which could be 
considered relevant. With the exception of Article 20(3) of SCSL (which refers specifically to 
the case law of the ad hoc Tribunals), the available normative guidance on the methodology 
for selecting external judicial decisions is limited. The lack of a clear methodology has given 
rise to suggestions of selectivity and instrumentality in the use of such decisions.
37
  
 
Indeed, several factors may influence the method by which external precedents are selected, 
including the specific wording of the legal framework, the background and approaches of the 
judges involved, the submissions of the parties and (it has been suggested) law clerks.
38
 
Additional considerations, such as the absence of a formal chain of communication between 
the various courts and tribunals, as well as language barriers, may also be pertinent. On this 
subject, some useful insights may be gained from the literature on domestic courts. For 
instance, in a study examining the use of foreign decisions in the domestic sphere, it has been 
observed that ‘any assumption of egalitarianism [between jurisdictions] would be highly 
                                                            
34
 See Acquaviva, supra note 8, at 8. 
35
 R. Dixon and K. A. A. Khan , Archbold on International Criminal Courts: Practice, Procedure and Evidence 
(2009), 171 (para. 5-56). Schabas considers that ‘the text of [Article 21(s) of the Rome Statute] clearly applies 
only to case law of the Court, but surely cannot be taken as depriving the Court of the authority to consider 
principles and rules of law derived from the case law of other judicial bodies. There are too many examples of 
references to the case law of the ad hoc tribunals and human rights courts like the European Court of Human 
Rights for such an a contrario interpretation of Article 21(2) to be entertained’: see W. Schabas, The 
International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (2010), 396. 
36
 Nerlich however continues, ‘but it does exist and if used in full awareness of its weakness, it may well make 
for a better understanding of the provisions that the ICC has to apply’: see Nerlich, supra note 33, at 320. 
37
 Bohlander and Findlay, for instance, find that, in the ICTY decisions they analysed, common law sources had 
been used more frequently than civil law sources and they argue that more emphasis should be placed on the 
‘legal-methodological integrity’ of the selection process: see M. Bohlander and M. J. Findlay, ‘The Use of 
Domestic Sources as a Basis for International Criminal Law Principles’, (2002) The Global Community 
Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence 2, at 7.  
38 Ibid., at 12. 
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unrealistic.’
39
 In view of resource constraints, judges searching for relevant external 
precedent may tend to focus their search on larger jurisdictions because: 
 
a larger population means a larger trial caseload, therefore more appeal cases, and 
therefore a larger number of legally significant appeals. This in turn suggests that an 
appeal court in a large province is likely already to have dealt with, and to have 
developed the doctrine to accommodate consistently, cases of a type arising for the first 
time in a smaller province.
40
 
 
While the methodology for selecting external judicial decisions gives rise to important 
questions of law and legitimacy, these would require a separate focus and are not covered by 
this paper. Rather, the inquiry herein begins after the relevant decisions would have been 
selected and concerns the legal appraisal of such decisions, an issue which is considered next. 
 
4. The appraisal-based approach 
 
As noted above, the appraisal-based approach implies that it is possible to identify an express 
legal appraisal preceding the use of external judicial decisions in the judgment. This legal 
appraisal, firstly, entails an assessment of the law being applied and, secondly, an evaluation 
of the congruence of that law with the legal framework of the referring court or tribunal at the 
relevant time. The appraisal of the law being applied would, moreover, also have to take into 
consideration broader contextual factors which may interfere with the law being applied, such 
as the possible influence of local idiosyncrasies. The next section discusses some instances in 
which an appraisal-based approach was adopted. In particular, it focuses on those instances in 
which, following a legal appraisal, it was found that the external judicial decisions in question 
required adjustment. Subsequently, the limits of such adjustment are considered in relation to 
the subject of crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute of the ICC. 
 
4.1 Instances of use of the appraisal-based approach 
 
The assessment of the law being applied by particular tribunals is not always a 
straightforward analysis and, in some cases, may be problematic. For instance, in Erdemović, 
Judge Cassese was of the view that, with respect to the Ei satzgruppen case,41 the United 
States Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg ‘acted under Control Council Law No. 10, and 
therefore its decisions carry more weight than the ones by national courts acting under 
national legislation.’
42
 However, in contrast, Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah considered 
that ‘[i]n relation to the post-World War Two military tribunals constituted under the London 
Charter or Control Council Law No. 10, doubt remains as to whether any of these military 
tribunals were truly “international in character”.’
43
 In this respect, they considered that ‘to the 
extent that the post-World War Two military tribunals constituted under the London Charter 
                                                            
39
 McCormick proceeds to characterize the universe of citable decisions an ‘uneven playing field’: see P. 
McCormick, ‘The Evolution of Coordinate Precedential Authority in Canada: Interprovincial Citations of 
Judicial Authority 1922-92’, (1994) 32 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 271, at 282. 
40
 P. McCormick, ‘Judicial Authority and the Provincial Courts of Appeal: A Statistical Investigation of Citation 
Practices’ (1993-1994) 22 Manitoba Law Journal 286, at 297–298. 
41
 The Trial of Otto Ohlendorf et al., , in Trials of War Criminals before the Nürnberg Military Tribunals under 
Control Council Law No. 10, (U.S. Govt Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1950), vol. IV (‘the Einsatzgruppen 
case’). 
42
 Prosecutor v. Dragen Erdemović, Judgment,  Case No. IT-96-22-A, 7 October 1997, at para. 27 (Separate 
And Dissenting Opinion Of Judge Cassese). 
43 Ibid., at para. 53 (Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah). 
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or Control Council Law No.10 were held to be international, this was merely with regard to 
their constitution, character and competence....There was no statement to the effect that the 
tribunals applied purely international law.’
44
 This suggests that the character of the law being 
applied by particular tribunals (and the decisions they deliver) could itself give rise to 
divergent views. 
 
In Krstić, the Trial Chamber had to consider the lawfulness of evacuations based on 
imperative military reasons. The Chamber referred to the case of Field Marshall Erich von 
Manstein, who had been convicted by a British military tribunal of the mass deportation and 
evacuation of civilian inhabitants of Ukraine.
45
 In this case, the Trial Chamber noted that ‘the 
judge advocate went so far as to suggest that deportation of civilians could never be justified 
by military necessity, but only by concern for the safety of the population.’
46
 However, rather 
than simply borrowing the Judge Advocate’s holding, the Chamber undertook a legal 
appraisal, particularly in the light of the Geneva Convention IV. On the basis of its 
assessment, the Chamber found that Judge Advocate’s holding: 
 
is contradicted by the text of the later Geneva Convention IV, which does include 
‘imperative military reasons’, and the Geneva Convention is more authoritative than the 
views of one judge advocate.
47
 
 
This is a good example of a legal appraisal which resulted in the need for adjustment of the 
external judicial decision in question, to ensure its congruence with the legal framework of 
the ICTY. In this case, the adjustment consisted in the rejection of that part of the Judge 
Advocate’s holding which had been superseded by the Geneva Conventions. 
 
The possibility of different judges adopting different approaches to the same national judicial 
decision emerges in the Krstić and Blagojević et al. decisions. The issue in both cases was the 
interpretation of the ‘intent to destroy’ requirement in the context of genocide. In Krstić, the 
Trial Chamber noted that, inter alia, some recent decisions had ‘interpreted the intent to 
destroy clause...so as to encompass evidence relating to acts that involved cultural and other 
non-physical forms of group destruction.’
48
 In particular, the Chamber referred to a decision 
of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, which had stated: 
 
the statutory definition of genocide defends a supra-individual object of legal 
protection, i.e. the social existence of the group...the intent to destroy the 
group...extends beyond physical and biological extermination...The text of the law does 
not therefore compel the interpretation that the culprit’s intent must be to exterminate 
physically at least a substantial number of the members of the group.
49
 
 
However, appraising this statement in light of the specificity of ICL and, in particular, the 
principle of nullum crimen sine lege, the Krstić Trial Chamber held that ‘despite recent 
developments [as articulated by the German Court’s finding above], customary international 
                                                            
44
 Ibid., at para. 54 (Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah). 
45
 See Von Lewinski (called von Manstein), British Military Court at Hamburg (Germany),19 December 1949, in 
16 Annual Dig. and Reports of Public International Law Cases 509, 521 (1949), cited in Prosecutor v. Radislav 
Krstić, Judgment, Case No. IT-98-33-T, 2 August 2001, at para. 526. 
46
 Krstić Trial Judgment, ibid., at para. 526 (fn 1178). 
47
 Ibid. 
48
 Ibid., at para. 577. 
49 Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 1290/99, 12 December 2000, para. (III)(4)(a)(aa). 
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law limits the definition of genocide to those acts seeking the physical or biological 
destruction of all or part of the group. Hence, an enterprise attacking only the cultural or 
sociological characteristics of a human group in order to annihilate these elements which give 
to that group its own identity distinct from the rest of the community would not fall under the 
definition of genocide.’
50
 Following this legal appraisal, the Krstić Trial Chamber concluded 
that the progressive interpretation of the German Court decision could not be reconciled with 
the nullum crimen principle and, therefore, had to be rejected.  
 
Relying on the same national judicial decision, the Blagojević et al. Trial Chamber proceeded 
to find that the term ‘destroy’ in the genocide definition can encompass the forcible transfer 
of a population, relying, inter alia, on the expansive reasoning of the German Court.51 In 
particular, the Chamber noted that the German Court had held that: 
 
such an interpretation would not be in violation of international law and that ‘it has 
generally been accepted that the limit of the meaning of the text has been exceeded only 
when the intention to destroy relates solely to a group’s cultural identity [that is, 
cultural genocide]’. The Constitutional Court upheld thereby, as constitutional, an 
interpretation by the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf (Higher Regional Court of 
Düsseldorf) and the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Supreme Court) of the term ‘destroy’ 
as meaning the destruction of ‘the group as a social unit in its specificity, uniqueness 
and feeling of belonging [and that] the biological-physical destruction of the group is 
not required.
52
 
 
Unlike the judges in Krstić, who had appraised the decision in light of the specificity of ICL 
and the nullum crimen principle, the judges in Blagojević et al. appeared to take the view that 
the expansive interpretation of ‘intent to destroy’, as articulated by the German Court, would 
not be in violation of international law at the relevant time. However, this conclusion was 
rejected by the Blagojević et al. Appeals Chamber, which held that:  
 
the Appeals Chamber is not convinced by the Trial Chamber’s reasoning that the 
forcible transfer operation alone...would suffice to demonstrate the principal 
perpetrators’ intent to ‘destroy’ the protected group. The Krstić Appeal Judgment 
clearly held that ‘forcible transfer does not constitute in and of itself a genocidal act’, 
and it is simply a relevant consideration as part of the overall factual assessment.
53
 
 
4.2 The limits of adjustment 
 
As noted above, the particular legal framework of the referring court or tribunal provides the 
yardstick against which external judicial decisions would have to be assessed. Given that 
such decisions would normally be interpreting and applying legal provisions external to that 
framework, the legal appraisal would serve to assess their congruence and indicate the 
required adjustment as appropriate. In this respect, the degree to which such decisions could 
be adjusted to reflect the specificities of the referring court or tribunal may have limits. This 
section provides some reflections on this point in relation to the subject of crimes against 
humanity under the Rome Statute of the ICC.  
                                                            
50 Krstić Trial Judgment, supra note 45, at para. 580. 
51
 Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević, Dragan Jokić, Judgment, Case No. IT-02-60-T, 17 January 2005, at para. 
665. 
52
 Ibid., at para. 664. 
53 Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević, Dragan Jokić, Judgement, Case No. IT-02-60-A, 9 May 2007, at para. 123. 
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It has been noted that the numerous compromises which were made in order to obtain 
agreement on the Rome Statute have ‘caused the Statute and Elements of Crimes to diverge 
substantially from the actual content of customary international law as it existed at the 
time.’
54
 One important instance of such a divergence is the requirement that crimes against 
humanity, under Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute, be committed pursuant to, or in 
furtherance of, ‘a State or organizational policy.’
55
 This requirement was seen as a necessary 
shield against the prosecution of crimes which were not actively supported by a state or 
similar entity.
56
 On this issue, the position in the Rome Statute is different from the position 
of the ICTY Appeals Chamber, which in Kunarac et al., following a review of state practice 
and opinio juris, found that, at the time of the alleged acts (in the early 1990s), ‘[t]he practice 
reviewed by the Appeals Chamber overwhelmingly supports the contention that no such 
[policy] requirement exists under customary international law.’
57
  
 
With respect to the policy requirement, therefore, the provisions of Article 7(2)(a) of the 
Rome Statute and the holding in Kunarac et al. differ fundamentally. In view of this 
divergence, it may simply not be possible to adjust the Kunarac et al. decision to cohere with 
the Rome Statute framework, as this would necessitate a re-characterisation of that decision. 
This case, therefore, provides a good example of the limits of adjustment of external judicial 
decision. However, the matter does not necessarily end there. The Kunarac et al. decision 
may still exert some degree of influence on the Rome Statute regime with respect to the 
interpretation of the policy requirement under Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute. Pursuant to 
this argument, the Kunarac et al. decision would tend to favour a broader, rather than stricter, 
interpretation of the policy requirement under Article 7(2)(a). In this sense, therefore, 
external precedent may still exert some degree of indirect influence, even where it may not be 
directly adjustable on a given issue. If the view is taken that precedent represents a collective 
‘body of wisdom,’
58
 then it would seem unwise to disregard it – possibly even in relation to 
relatively closed systems such as the Rome Statute and where particular decisions may not be 
directly adjustable. For instance, Judge Hunt suggests that the influence exerted by precedent 
may provide a useful means for the development of the law. He expresses the hope that the 
ICC judges ‘will accept a responsibility to see that international criminal law continues to 
develop in the future and does not stand still and therefore become obsolete.’
59
 
 
According to Judge Hunt, the emphasis on the development of the law is supported by Article 
10 and Article 21 of the Rome Statute.
60
 However, any responsibility that ICC judges may 
have with respect to the development of the law has to remain subordinate to their primary 
responsibility to apply the law of the Rome Statute framework, including the nullum crimen 
                                                            
54
 D. Hunt, ‘The International Criminal Court: High Hopes, ‘Creative Ambiguity’ and an Unfortunate Mistrust 
in International Judges’, (2004) 2 JICJ 56, at 67. 
55
 Hunt observes that ‘[n]o such requirement of policy exists in current international criminal law’: see ibid., at 
64-65. 
56
 Ibid., at 64. 
57 Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic, Judgment, Case No. IT-96-23&IT-96-
23/1-A, 12 June 2002, at para. 98 (fn 114). 
58
 N. Duxbury, The Nature and Authority of Precedent (2008), 99. 
59
 Hunt, supra note 54, at 60-61. 
60 Article 10 provides that ‘Nothing in this Part shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way 
existing or developing rules of international law for purposes other than this Statute.’ Article 21 (Applicable 
Law) refers to the various sources to which the Court may have recourse and refers, inter alia, to general 
principles of law and those principles and rules of law ‘as interpreted in its previous decisions’. See also Hunt, 
supra note 54, at 60-61 (fn 22). 
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principle as set out in Article 22. In particular, they have to ensure that the definitions of a 
crimes ‘be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy.’
61
 In light of this, where 
external judicial decisions fundamentally diverge from, and may not be adjusted to, the Rome 
Statute framework, it is considered that any influence that they may exert has to be strictly 
circumscribed by the provisions of that framework.
62
 Indeed, some have questioned why the 
case law of the ad hoc Tribunals should exert any influence on the Rome Statute. For 
instance, Nerlich considers: 
 
[w]hy should the case law of the ad hoc tribunals shed light on the Rome Statute or its 
subsidiary instruments? The Rome Statute has established an international criminal 
jurisdiction that is distinct from, and independent of, the ad hoc tribunals; and when 
interpreting legal texts applicable in a given jurisdiction one does not normally turn to 
the jurisprudence of other jurisdictions relating to the interpretation of other legal 
texts.
63
 
 
While the present author considers that the above view may be too restrictive, particularly 
given the common purpose underlying the ad hoc Tribunals and the ICC, and the complex 
relationship between the Rome Statute and customary international law,
64
 it does focus 
attention on the importance of an appraisal-based approach to external judicial decisions, in 
order to ensure the congruence of such decisions with the ICC’s legal framework. The next 
part proceeds to examine cases in which a more flexible approach to external judicial 
decisions was adopted. 
 
5. The flexible approach 
 
This part covers cases where external judicial decisions have been borrowed and introduced 
in their new environment on the basis of a limited appraisal. It is organized by decision type, 
namely: 
 
1. National judicial decisions; 
2. Judicial decisions from international courts operating in other branches of law; 
3. Judicial decisions from sister international criminal courts and tribunals. 
 
5.1 National judicial decisions 
 
Cryer et al. observe that ‘[t]he assertions of international law in domestic cases can be 
affected by local idiosyncrasies. These can arise from the domestic statutes that are being 
                                                            
61
 Article 22(2) of the Rome Statute. 
62 For instance, in case of ambiguity with respect to the definition of a crime, this should be interpreted in favour 
of the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted (see Article 22(2) of the Rome Statute). 
63
 Nerlich, supra note 33, at 317. 
64
 On the complex relationship between the Rome Statute and customary international law, Grover observes that 
‘[o]n balance, it is submitted that states parties should be presumed to have intended that Articles 6, 7, and 8 [of 
the Rome Statute], to the extent possible and without violating the principle of legality, be interpreted in light of 
relevant and applicable law as it existed when the crime is alleged to have been committed…Further, Articles 10 
and 22(3) [of the RS] contemplate custom evolving and Article 21(2) [RS] renders custom and treaty law 
authoritative interpretive aids. In interpreting Articles 6, 7, and 8 in light of relevant and applicable law which 
exists at the time the alleged crime was committed, Article 22 serves as a reminder that, where the Rome Statute 
cannot be reconciled with subsequent law, the definitions of crimes in Articles 6, 7, and 8 prevail’: see L. 
Grover, ‘A Call to Arms: Fundamental Dilemmas Confronting the Interpretation of Crimes in the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court’, (2010) 21 EJIL 543, at 581-582. 
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evaluated or applied, or from a court seeing international criminal law though a distinctly 
national lens.’
65
 In spite of this, in a number of the judgments examined by this paper, there 
was no express legal appraisal preceding the use of national judicial decisions. This is 
problematic, in view of the possible local idiosyncrasies which could interfere with the law 
being applied. 
 
In Akayesu, the Trial Chamber had to interpret the meaning of ‘causing serious bodily or 
mental harm to members of the group’ under Article 2 of the ICTR Statute (genocide). In so 
doing, the Chamber used the findings of the District Court of Jerusalem in the Eichmann 
case,
66
 without, however, expressly considering whether the interpretation contained in 
Eichmann, which was based on a national law – namely Article 1 of the Nazis and Nazi 
Collaborators–Punishment Law (5710-1950) – reflected applicable international law.
67
 
Although the Israeli national law, on which Eichmann was based, made reference specifically 
to ‘crimes against the Jewish people’, the ICTR Trial Chamber, with little express discussion 
in the judgment, took the view that this was equivalent to ‘genocide under another legal 
definition.’
68
 While this view finds support in the writings of some scholars,
69
 others have 
pointed out the dangers inherent in the peculiar categorization of the Israeli law.
70
 In view of 
the rather limited appraisal of this case, therefore, the approach may be characterised as 
flexible. 
 
The dangers of a flexible reliance on national judicial decisions may be especially 
pronounced with respect to decisions which appear to be interpreting international law but 
which, in reality, would be based on a peculiar interpretation from a distinctly national lens. 
Such decisions – which could be characterised as ‘red herrings’ – have the potential to 
mislead, particularly where they are relied on without appraisal. For the reasons discussed 
below, Barbie could be regarded as such a decision.71 In this context, a succession of ICTY 
Trial Chambers have relied on the expansive interpretation of ‘civilians’, as articulated in 
Barbie, to find that the term for the purposes of crimes against humanity included those who 
were members of a resistance movement and former combatants. The Mrksić (Vukovar) Rule 
61 Decision was the first to hold that the specific situation of the victim at the moment the 
                                                            
65
 R. Cryer et al., An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure  (2010), 12. In Čelebići, the 
judges at the Trial Chamber noted that in any national legal system, legal notions are ‘utilised in a specific legal 
context and are attributed their own specific connotations by the jurisprudence of that system’: Prosecutor v. 
Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic also known as ‘Pavo’, Hazim Delic, Esad Landzo also known as ‘Zenga’, 
Judgment, Case No. IT-96-21-T, 16 November 1998, at para. 431. 
66
 Attorney General of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann 36 ILR 5, Jerusalem District Court (12 December 1961). 
67 Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 2 September 1998, at para. 503. 
68
 Ibid. 
69
 W. Schabas, ‘Judicial Activism and the Crime of Genocide’ in S. Darcy and J. Powderly (eds.), Judicial 
Creativity at the International Criminal Tribunals (2010), 64. 
70 For instance, it has been pointed out that ‘to proscribe the murder of Jews as a crime against Jews carries the 
dangerous implication that it is not a crime against non Jews. […T]o define a crime in terms of the religion or 
nationality of the victim, instead of the nature of the criminal act, is wholly out of keeping with the needs of the 
times and trend of modern law’: see T. Taylor, ‘Large Questions in the Eichmann Case’, New York Times 
Magazine, 22 January 1961. Kittrie notes that although ‘[t]he explanation has been offered, in partial answer to 
this argument, that in referring to “crimes against the Jewish people” the Israeli law was merely classifying the 
object of the crime, similar to the way a statute book may divide offenses according to whether they are “crimes 
against property” or “crimes against a person”...Yet the question remains whether such differentiation between 
the objects of international crimes serves a valid purpose and is at all necessary.’ See N. K. Kittrie, ‘A Post 
Mortem of the Eichmann Case. The Lessons for International Law’ (1964) 55 Journal of Criminal Law, 
Criminology, and Police Science, at 24-25. 
71
 Fédération Nationale Des Déportés et Internés Résistants et Patriotes and Others v. Barbie, ‘Arrêt’, French 
Court of Cassation (Criminal Chamber), International Law Reports, Vol. 78 (1985). 
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crimes were committed, rather than his status, had to be taken into account in determining 
civilian status for the purposes of Article 5 of the ICTY Statute.
72
 Subsequently, in 
interpreting the meaning of civilians in a similar context, in Tadić, the Trial Chamber 
considered the Barbie case to be of assistance, as it had addressed ‘[p]recisely this issue.’73 
Although the Chamber took note of the fact that ‘the court in the Barbie case was applying 
national legislation’,
74
 and that the prosecution of the accused for crimes against humanity 
had been relied upon ‘to deny the accused’s appeal on the bases of disguised extradition and 
an elapsed statute of limitations’,
75
 the Chamber nevertheless relied on it to hold that a wide 
definition of civilian population was justified and that those actively involved in a resistance 
movement could qualify as victims of crimes against humanity.
76
 
 
Subsequently, both the Blaškić Trial Chamber77 and the Kupreškić et al. Trial Chamber78 
imported the expansive interpretation of civilians. Indeed, in Kupreškić et al., the Chamber 
held that this expansive interpretation was ‘borne out by the case law’, a holding which could 
potentially give the impression of widespread support for this interpretation.
79
 In fact, 
however, the only two cases referred to by the Chamber were the Barbie case and the Mrksić 
et al. (Mrksić (Vukovar) Rule 61 Decision (which itself had relied on Barbie). 
 
As Sadat points out, although the Barbie case could appear to be interpreting international 
law, it was in fact merely providing a peculiar interpretation of a 1964 French law driven by 
very specific national circumstances.
80
 The expansive definition of civilians which the French 
Court of Cassation had adopted was largely driven by domestic considerations, namely, 
overcoming the statute of limitations with respect to war crimes. In the domestic context, this 
expansive definition served to clear the way for the prosecution of Barbie for crimes 
committed against the French Resistance as crimes against humanity rather than war 
crimes.
81
 Nevertheless, the ICTY judges who relied on Barbie in the abovementioned cases 
do not appear to have paid much attention to the local idiosyncrasies of this case and their 
approaches may, therefore, be characterised as flexible. It is notable that the expansive 
interpretation of civilians was subsequently rejected by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in favour 
of a narrower construction of the term based, primarily, on Article 50(1) of Additional 
Protocol I.
82
 
 
Where judges adopt a flexible approach to external precedent, this may influence the outcome 
of their decisions and, indeed, may have profound implications for the principle of legality 
                                                            
72 See the reference in Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksić, Miroslav Radić, Veselin Šljivančanin, Judgment, Case No. IT-
95-13/1-T, 27 September 2007, at para. 450. 
73
 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić aka ‘Dule’, Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 7 May 1997, at para. 641. 
74
 Ibid., at para. 642. 
75
 Ibid. 
76 Ibid., at para. 643. 
77
 Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-14-T, 3 March 2000, at para. 212. 
78
 Kupreškić et al. Trial Judgment, supra note 11, at para. 548. 
79
 Ibid. 
80 See L. N. Sadat, ‘The Nuremberg Paradox’, (2010) 58 Am J Comp L 151, at 180. 
81
 This interpretation was affirmed in a judgment of the Court of Cassation of 3 June 1988. Moreover, Sadat 
argues that the French Court of Cassation interpreted Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter (on crimes against 
humanity) in order to permit Barbie’s trial in France, while at the same time limiting the Nuremberg Charter’s 
application to any crimes outside the World War II context, thus potentially shielding democratic states from 
criminal liability. See ibid., at 181. 
82
 See, inter alia, Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-14-A, 9 July 2004, at para. 113; 
Prosecutor v. Dario Kordić and Mario Čerkez, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, 17 December 2004, at para. 
97; and Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Judgment, Case No. IT-98-29-A, 30 November 2006, at para. 144. 
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and the fairness of the proceedings. For instance, in the Mrksić (Vukovar) Rule 61 Decision, 
after considering that an expansive definition of civilians was supported by the case law 
(Barbie), the Chamber found that ‘resistance fighters who had laid down their arms’ could 
fall within the meaning of civilians for the purposes of crimes against humanity.
83
 This 
finding led the Chamber to reconfirm the indictment against the three Accused and to issue 
an international warrant of arrest against them on the basis, inter alia, of crimes against 
humanity. In contrast, however, the Mrksić et al. Trial Chamber, which was delivered after 
the findings of the Appeals Chambers in Blaškić and Kordić et al., adopted a narrower 
definition of this term. On the evidence, it found that ‘of the 194 persons identified as among 
those alleged in the Indictment to have been murdered at Ovčara…, 181 were known to be 
active in the Croatian forces in Vukovar…’.
84
 In light of this evidence and the narrower 
definition of civilians adopted by the Chamber, it found that, while the crimes charged 
against the Accused could qualify as war crimes, they could not qualify as ‘crimes against 
humanity in the particular circumstances of this case.’
85
 The Chamber thus proceeded to 
dismiss the charges based on crimes against humanity and to retain those based on war 
crimes.
86
 
 
It should be emphasised that, in many cases, the appellate mechanism may serve to rectify 
problematic uses of external judicial decisions at first instance. However, there may be limits 
to this safeguard and it should not be considered as a substitute for the appraisal-based 
approach. This is because some first instance judgments may not be appealed. For instance, 
in Bisengimana, in its analysis of the general elements of crimes against humanity under 
Article 3 of the ICTR Statute, the Trial Chamber relied on the expansive interpretation of 
civilians, as articulated in the Blaškić Trial Judgement.87 Even though this expansive 
definition was subsequently rejected by the Blaškić Appeals Judgment, as the Bisengimana 
conviction (which was based on a guilty plea) was not subsequently appealed,
88
 the expansive 
definition of civilians was not revisited. 
 
5.2 Judicial decisions from international courts operating in other branches of law 
 
As the cases of Furundžija and Kunarac et al., discussed below, attest, although international 
judicial decisions, such as international human rights decisions, would generally apply 
international law, they may still require adjustment when used in the context of international 
criminal adjudication. In Furundžija, the Trial Chamber, finding that IHL did not provide a 
definition of torture, relied on the definition of the 1984 Torture Convention and, inter alia, 
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’),
89
 to flesh out the 
elements of torture in an armed conflict.
90
 Amongst the elements of the definition which the 
Trial Chamber identified, one was that ‘at least one of the persons involved in the torture 
process must be a public official.’
91
 However, in subsequently dismissing this public official 
requirement, in Kunarac et al., the Trial Chamber emphasized that: 
                                                            
83
 Transcript of Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksić, Miroslav Radić, Veselin Šljivančanin, Review of the Indictment 
Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Mrksić (Vukovar) Rule 61 Decision), Case No. IT-
95-13-I, 3 April 1996. 
84
 Mrksić et al. Trial Judgment, supra note 72, at para. 481.  
85
 Ibid., at paras. 479-81.  
86
 Ibid., at paras. 483-4. 
87 The Prosecutor v. Paul Bisengimana, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-00-60-T, 13 April 2006, at para. 49. 
88
 Ibid., at para. 9. 
89
 Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, 10 December 1998, at para. 160. 
90
 Ibid., at paras. 159–162. 
91 Ibid. 
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[i]n attempting to define an offence under international humanitarian law, the Trial 
Chamber must be mindful of the specificity of this body of law....The Trial Chamber is 
therefore wary not to embrace too quickly and too easily concepts and notions 
developed in a different legal context. The Trial Chamber is of the view that notions 
developed in the field of human rights can be adjusted in international humanitarian 
law only if they take into consideration the specificities of the latter body of law.
92
 
 
Although, in Furundžija, the public official requirement did not play a critical role, because 
the accused was himself a public official, this case underscores the need for an appraisal-
based approach to external precedent, in order to assess its congruence with the legal 
framework of the referring court or tribunal and to effect any adjustment as may be 
necessary. 
 
5.3 Judicial decisions from sister international criminal courts and tribunals 
 
In view of the similarity of the factual and legal issues with which they are concerned, 
international criminal judges often refer to the decisions of sister international criminal courts 
and tribunals. However, a flexible approach to using these decisions may risk taking limited 
account of the congruence of these decisions with the legal framework of the referring court 
or tribunal. In some cases where the judges of the ad hoc Tribunals had to define recurring 
legal concepts, such as ‘committing’ as a mode of participation, they appear to have simply 
borrowed such definitions from previous judgments with limited appraisal. This approach 
may be problematic.  
 
In Seromba, the Trial Chamber relied on the holding in Krstić that ‘committing’ covers 
‘physically perpetrating a crime’,
93
 to find that ‘[p]articipation by ‘committing’ means the 
direct physical or personal participation of the accused in the perpretation [sic] of a crime or 
the culpable omission of an act that was mandated by a rule of criminal law.
’94
 From an 
analysis of the Seromba judgment, it would appear as if the judges simply borrowed the 
Krstić holding without appraisal.95 However, subsequently, the Seromba Appeals Chamber 
emphasized that ‘committing’ is not limited to direct and physical perpetration and that other 
acts can constitute direct participation in the actus reus of the crime. In this respect, the 
Appeals Chamber found that ‘the Trial Chamber erred in law by holding that ‘committing’ 
requires direct and physical perpetration of the crime by the offender.’
96
 This case would 
suggest that, even where a particular issue is well settled in the jurisprudence, depending on 
the circumstances of each case, some level of appraisal of external judicial decisions would 
still be appropriate. 
 
In Duch, the ECCC Trial Chamber had to consider whether rape constituted a discrete crime 
against humanity, separate from torture, in the period within the court’s temporal jurisdiction, 
namely 1975-1979. In this respect, the trial judges used, inter alia, the decisions of the ad hoc 
Tribunals and the SCSL to support their conclusion that rape could constitute a discrete crime 
                                                            
92
 Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac, and Zoran Vukovic, Judgment, Case No. IT-96-23-T& IT-
96-23/1-T, 22 February 2001, at paras. 470–471. Emphasis added. 
93 Krstić Trial Judgment, supra note 45, at para. 601. 
94
 The Prosecutor v. Athanase Seromba, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-2001-66-I, 13 December 2006, at para. 302. 
95
 It should be noted that, in this case, the Trial Chamber also referred to the internal decision of The Prosecutor 
v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A, 1 June 2001, at para. 187. 
96 The Prosecutor v. Athanase Seromba, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-2001-66-A, 12 March 2008, at para. 161. 
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against humanity.
97
 However, in this case, the trial judges did not sufficiently appraise these 
external judicial decisions to satisfy themselves that they reflected the relevant law at the 
relevant time. In view of the different temporal jurisdictions of the ECCC, on the one hand, 
and of the ad hoc Tribunals and the SCSL, on the other hand, the law applied by the decisions 
of the ad hoc Tribunals and the SCSL was not necessarily congruent with the ECCC legal 
framework. Indeed, on appeal, the ECCC Supreme Court Chamber observed that: 
 
[t]he ICTY was established in 1993 and its temporal jurisdiction extends to criminal 
acts committed since 1991. The ICTR was established in 1994, with its jurisdiction 
covering criminal acts committed during the same year. The SCSL’s temporal 
jurisdiction applies with respect to criminal acts committed since 30 November 1996. 
Thus, these particular convictions do not lend support to a finding that rape was a crime 
against humanity under international law during 1975-1979.
98
 
 
The Supreme Court Chamber proceeded to reverse the Trial Chamber’s findings on this 
point.
99
 This case, again, underscores the importance of the legal appraisal of external 
precedent in order to ensure that the law being applied by such precedent reflects the 
applicable law of the referring court or tribunal at the relevant time. 
 
6. Inconsistent approaches between cases 
 
The above analysis has distinguish d between cases where judges have adopted appraisal-
based or flexible approaches towards external precedent. However, this discussion would 
have to be nuanced further, in that, in some instances, the approach of the same individual 
judge has not been consistent between different cases. For instance, in his extra-curial 
consideration of the use of ECtHR case law by the ad hoc Tribunals, Judge Cassese 
emphasized the importance of the appraisal-based approach. In particular, he stated that ‘even 
where international criminal tribunals apply the case law of other international courts, such as 
the European Court, international criminal proceedings display their own specific 
characteristics which cannot be ignored.’
100
 However, as noted above, in Furundžija (where 
Judge Cassese sat together with Judges Mumba and May), in using, inter alia, ECtHR case 
law to set out the elements of torture, the Chamber did not sufficiently adjust the definition of 
torture derived from international human rights case law to the specificities of ICL, as it 
retained the public official requirement. Indeed, it is notable that Judge Mumba, who presided 
over the Furundžija Trial Chamber, presided also over the Kunarac et al. Trial Chamber, 
which subsequently dismissed the public official requirement, and which underscored the 
need to take account of the structural differences between IHL and international human rights 
law, therefore, advocating a more appraisal-based approach. With respect to their legal 
appraisals of external judicial decisions, therefore, the approaches of Judges Cassese and 
Mumba have, in practice, not been consistent between different cases.  
 
Indeed, a similar observation may be made in relation to Judge Liu, who also sat on the 
Kunarac et al. Trial Chamber which, as noted, adopted an appraisal-based approach. 
However, subsequently, the Blagojević et al. Trial Chamber (over which Judge Liu presided) 
adopted a more flexible approach to national judicial decisions, by borrowing, as discussed 
                                                            
97 Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, Judgment, Case No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, 26 July 2010, at para. 361. 
98
 Kaing Guek Eav alias ‘Duch’, Appeal Judgment, Case No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/SC, ECCC Supreme Court 
Chamber, 3 February 2012, at para. 178. 
99
 Ibid., at para. 180. 
100 Cassese, supra note 2, at 22. 
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above, the broad interpretation of genocide articulated by the German Court. Therefore, even 
here, Judge Liu’s approach has not been consistent from one case to another. The purpose of 
this brief sketch has been to indicate that the approaches of judges to external judicial 
decisions are not set in stone and even the same judge may, in practice, shift between a more 
appraisal-based to a more flexible approach between different cases. This suggests that it is 
not only judges from a particular legal system (such as common law) who are more likely to 
adopt a particular approach to external precedent. Indeed, given that, in some cases, the same 
individual judges (from different legal systems) have adopted an inconsistent approach 
between cases, it is submitted that there may be an insufficient emphasis on judicial 
methodology regarding the use of external judicial decisions at the international criminal 
courts and tribunals. Greater focus on this subject and, in particular, on the importance of an 
appraisal-based approach to such decisions would, therefore, be desirable. 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper has focused on the approaches of international criminal judges to using external 
judicial decisions and, in particular, has distinguished between the appraisal-based and 
flexible approaches. Because of the limited number of judgments examined and the fact that 
the analysis has only included express legal appraisals, only a few remarks may be made 
here. 
 
The analysis found that, in a numb r of cases, international criminal judges have adopted a 
flexible approach to external judicial decisions. In particular, they did not undertake a legal 
appraisal to ensure such decisions were congruent with the legal framework of the referring 
court or tribunal at the relevant time. Nor did they take account of broader, contextual 
considerations which could have influenced the law being applied by those decisions, such as 
the potential interference of local idiosyncrasies. The flexible approach to using external 
judicial decisions is problematic because it tends to encourage the assimilation of such 
decisions into the legal framework of the referring court or tribunal, possibly without the 
necessary adjustment. This issue is particularly pronounced with respect to red herring 
decisions, which appear to be interpreting international law but which, in reality, would be 
based on a peculiar interpretation of that law. These decisions, therefore, have greater 
potential to mislead when relied on without appraisal. 
 
Using external judicial decisions without the necessary adjustment could have profound 
implications for the law applied by the referring court or tribunal and could, ultimately, 
impact on the principle of legality and the fairness of the proceedings. This, therefore, 
suggests the need for greater rigour in the judicial methodology for using external judicial 
decisions and, in particular, the importance of the appraisal-based approach to ensure the 
congruence of such decisions with the legal framework of the referring court or tribunal. The 
appraisal-based approach would enable international judges to determine, firstly, whether 
such decisions may be assimilated within the legal framework and, secondly, whether they 
require adjustment. In this context, it is worth recalling that judges should be ‘wary not to 
embrace too quickly and too easily concepts and notions developed in a different legal 
context’ without appropriate adjustment.
101
  
 
In some cases, the legal appraisal may indicate that the law applied by certain external 
judicial decisions diverges so fundamentally from the legal framework of the referring court 
                                                            
101 See Kunarac et al. Trial Judgment, supra note 92, at paras. 470–471. 
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or tribunal that it would not be possible to assimilate such decisions directly. In such cases, 
even though such decisions could continue to have an indirect effect on interpretation, any 
influence they may exert has to be strictly circumscribed by the provisions of the legal 
framework of the referring court or tribunal.  
 
Finally, the analysis suggested that the adoption of either the appraisal-based or flexible 
approaches to external judicial decisions is not necessarily linked to the specific legal 
backgrounds of the judges – it is not a matter which, for instance, only concerns judges from 
common law systems. Indeed, in some cases, the approach of the same individual judge 
(from different legal systems) has not been consistent between cases. This would indicate, 
again, the need for greater rigour in the judicial methodology for using external judicial 
decisions and, in particular, the need for more attention to the appraisal-based approach. 
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